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‘The ally of the People’1
‘Be you ever so high, the law is above you’2
ABSTRACT
The Auditor General plays a key role in the constitutional framework that is designed 
to support good governance. This article critically reviews the constitutional position 
of the Auditor General. It assesses the extent to which, in practice, office-holders 
enjoy the necessary individual and institutional independence and security of tenure 
to enable them to carry out their constitutional mandate, especially in the face of 
efforts by some political leaders and senior public officials (‘politically exposed 
persons’ (PEPs)) to abuse their position through acts of corruption and misuse of 
public office. It also explores the effectiveness of the support and accountability 
mechanisms for Auditors General. In doing so, the article reviews the position of the 
Auditor General in the constitutions of a number of Anglophone African states.
Keywords: Auditor General; constitutional role of; individual and institutional 
independence of; politically exposed persons; Anglophone African constitutions. 
INTRODUCTION
The Constitution is the supreme law of a state3 and as a former Chief Justice of 
South Africa, Justice Ismail Mohammed, once observed, it is not simply a 
document which mechanically defines the structures of government and the 
relations between the government and the governed, but it is: 
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[A] mirror reflecting the national soul, the identification of the ideals and 
aspirations of a nation; the articulation of the values binding its people and 
disciplining its government.4
The words ‘disciplining its government’ emphasise that whilst constitutional 
office-holders enjoy significant powers and privileges, they are bound to act in 
accordance with its ‘good governance’ values that include integrity, transparency 
and accountability.5 
The legislature traditionally plays an oversight role over the executive in 
such matters. In reality this has proved of limited value, not least due to the 
dominance of the ruling party in many countries. Thus modern Constitutions 
now often enshrine a range of independent watchdog bodies each enjoying a 
distinct mandate designed to secure good governance. For example, offices of 
the ombudsman investigate complaints from members of the public into alleged 
maladministration by public officials, anti-corruption commissions work to 
prevent corruption in the public service whilst human rights commissions 
provide a vehicle for individuals to seek redress against public officials for a 
breach of their constitutional rights. Added to this list is the Auditor General 
whose constitutional mandate is to audit and to report annually to the legislature 
on the use of public funds.
Including the Auditor General in this framework of ‘state institutions 
supporting constitutional democracy’6 emphasises that this is not an isolated and 
somewhat remote office but part of a scheme that is designed to ensure that the 
good governance values enshrined in the Constitution apply to the daily 
administration of the country at all levels. In essence, such institutions form an 
additional branch of government. 
This article critically reviews the constitutional position of the Auditor 
General. It assesses the extent to which, in practice, the office-holders enjoy the 
necessary individual and institutional independence and security of tenure to 
enable them to carry out their constitutional mandate, especially in the face of 
efforts by some political leaders and senior public officials (hereinafter ‘politically 
4 State v Acheson [1991] (2) SA 805 (Nm) 813, A-B. See also the comments of the Supreme 
Court of Ghana in Taffour v Attorney General [1980] GLR 637, 647–48.
5 See for example the Constitution of Kenya, article 10 and the Preamble to the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe.
6 A phrase used to describe such institutions in the Constitution of South Africa 1996, ch 
9.
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exposed persons’7 (PEPs)) to abuse their position through acts of corruption and 
misuse of public office. It also explores the effectiveness of the support and 
accountability mechanisms for Auditors General. In doing so, the article reviews 
the position of the Auditor General in the Constitutions of a number of Anglophone 
African states (collectively referred to as the ‘Constitutions’).8 These have been 
chosen as most are based on the Westminster export model Constitution and, 
although much amended or replaced, still share a similar structure.
The article is divided into the following parts. Part 1 explores the constitutional 
role of the Auditor General in maintaining transparency and accountability in 
public finances whilst Part 2 considers the basic provisions for developing an 
effective auditing role. Parts 3 and 4 then analyse the constitutional provisions in 
support of individual and institutional autonomy of the office and office-holder. 
Part 5 examines the mechanisms to support and oversee the work of the Auditor 
General whilst Part 6 assesses the constitutional provisions for the removal of the 
Auditor General. Part 7 then provides a conclusion.
PART 1: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE AUDITOR 
GENERAL IN MAINTAINING TRANSPARENCY AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PUBLIC FINANCES 
i) The challenge of PEPs
The history of corruption and the looting of state assets by African PEPs is a long 
and depressing one. The well-documented case of Sani Abacha highlights to 
challenge facing many states. Abacha was the Head of State in Nigeria (and thus a 
PEP) who had seized power in a military coup in 1993. Between 1992 and 1998 he 
and his family accumulated wealth at an extraordinary rate, including extracting 
huge sums from the Central Bank of Nigeria by raising a series of demands for 
7 For the purposes of this article, the term ‘PEPs’ refers to ‘individuals who are or have 
been entrusted domestically with prominent public functions, for example Heads of State 
or of government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military officials, 
senior executives of state owned corporations, important political party officials’: see 
Financial Action Task Force International Standards on Combating Money Laundering 
and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations (2012) 
Glossary.
8 Examples are drawn from Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. However, it is not the intention of the article to consider 
the constitutional position of the Auditor General in each jurisdiction.
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funds to meet spurious national security needs.9 Frederick Chiluba, the then 
President of Zambia, later used the same ‘national security’ tactic to loot state 
funds.10 Other well-known cases involve theft of state development funds by 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, a former state governor of Bayelsa State in Nigeria,11 
the inflation of the price of government contracts by Mahmoud Thiam, a former 
Minister of Mines in Guinea12 and the widespread abuse of public funds by 
Teodoro Obiang, the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea. As a result, 
countless people throughout Africa have been (and remain) victims of a breakdown 
of basic infrastructure and public services.
There are ongoing efforts recover the proceeds of corruption that were 
laundered abroad and for their return to the victim states, albeit this remains work 
in progress. Whilst such efforts are laudable, less attention has been paid to 
preventing such criminality by PEPs in the ‘victim’ states themselves. What is 
striking about each of the above cases is the seeming lack of any accountability of 
the PEPs for their actions due to the failure of (or lack of) effective constitutional 
accountability mechanisms. This is not surprising given that PEPs are the most 
powerful political individuals in any state and can ‘control the controls’. For 
example, by preventing, or undermining, domestic investigations into corruption 
and money laundering and controlling the operation of international cooperation 
mechanisms designed to trace the proceeds of corruption.13 They are often assisted 
in their criminality by powerful banking and other financial institutions through 
which the proceeds of corruption are laundered as well as by imaginative and 
inventive professional money launderers.14 
The task of preventing such criminality by PEPs is therefore a daunting one 
but the suitably adapted words of Lord Denning (quoted above) suggest how this 
can be done: ‘Be you ever so high, the Constitution is above you’. Thus the 
9 Much of the activity of the Abacha family members is described in the case of Companie 
Naga d’Importation SA v Australia and NewZealand Banking Group Queen’s Bench 
Division (Comm) 27 February 2001 (unreported). Upheld on appeal [2003] EWCA Civ 
1101. 
10 The facts are set out in Attorney General of Zambia v Meer Care and Desai [2007] 
EWHC 952 (Peter Smith J). See also the discussion below. 
11 See Nigeria v Santolina Investment Corp [2007] EWHC 3053 (QB).
12 The facts appear in United States of America v Thiam: Government’s Sentencing 
Memorandum 25 August 2017 <www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/fcpa/cases/mahmoud-
thiam> accessed 3 October 2018.
13 John Hatchard, Combating Corruption: Legal Approaches to Supporting Good 
Governance and Integrity in Africa (Edward Elgar 2014) 279 et seq.
14 See generally the report by the Financial Action Task Force Professional Money 
Laundering (FATF 2018). 
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challenge is to develop and maintain effective constitutional accountability 
mechanisms that are capable of holding PEPs to account for their use (or abuse) of 
public finances. This is the onerous and challenging role played by the Auditor 
General. 
ii) The ‘ally of the people’
Article 10 of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) 
emphasises the need for each State Party to take the necessary measures ‘in 
accordance with the fundamental principles of its domestic law’, to ‘enhance 
transparency in its public administration, including with regard to its 
organisation, functioning and decision-making processes, where appropriate’. 
This includes taking steps to ensure fiscal integrity, transparency and 
accountability in government and the public service. Further the UNCAC 
Conference of States Parties (the CoSP) has acknowledged that ‘efficient, 
accountable and transparent service delivery is one of the key components in 
building an anti-corruption environment in the public sector’.15 The key role 
played by Auditors General in enhancing this goal is echoed in article IX of 
the Commonwealth Principles16 which were endorsed by Commonwealth 
Heads of Government in 2003. 
As Yilmaz and Beris have pointed out, accountability addresses a number of 
elements including providing for transparency in the use of public funds and public 
accessibility to such information.17 However, the key to accountability is ‘control’. 
This requires an independent audit body or bodies to ensure fiscal integrity, i.e. 
that the powers of such office-holders are not abused or misused and that there is 
accountability for retaining ‘sound and transparent public expenditure and 
financial management systems’.18 This has the dual purpose of both encouraging 
15 CoSP Resolution 6/6 2015, follow-up to the Marrakech declaration on the prevention 
of corruption (2015), Preamble. All the African states discussed in this article are state 
parties to the UNCAC.
16 Commonwealth (Latimer House) Principles on the Accountability of and Relationship 
between the Three Branches of Government. Article IX states ‘Independent bodies such 
as … Auditors General … and similar oversight institutions can play a key role in 
enhancing public awareness of good governance and rule of law issues’.
17 Serder Yilmaz and Yakup Beris ‘Good Governance and the Emergence of a New 
Accountability Agenda’ in Gabor Peteri (ed), Finding the Money: Public Accountability 
and Service Efficiency through Fiscal Transparency (Local Government and Public 
Service Reform Initiative, Open Society Initiative, 2008) 30.
18 Ibid.
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‘ethical behaviour by making unethical behaviour hard to accomplish and easy to 
detect’ and helping to bring to light any abuse of power.19 
The position of Auditor General is enshrined in all the Constitutions20 and as 
the supreme audit authority, the office-holder has responsibility for auditing on an 
annual basis the accounts of all government and other state institutions,21 
publishing an annual report and submitting this to the legislature for scrutiny and 
debate. Thus the office-holder is the key constitutional figure in overseeing the 
proper use of public resources and, if necessary, of publicly exposing any abuse of 
public funds. This role is neatly explained by Mwita J in Transparency 
International (TI Kenya) v Attorney General:22 
… [T]he Auditor General is an ally of the people. While Parliament is the 
peoples’ representative, the Auditor General provides Parliament with accurate 
and independently derived audit information on state organs and public bodies 
expenditure [and] thus ensures that there is public sector accountability.23
The effective performance of this responsibility is neatly highlighted in two 
cases. In 2017 a report by the Zambian Auditor General alleged that officials in the 
Ministry of Education had diverted donor funds provided for poverty alleviation 
projects into off-shore bank accounts through the use of shell companies. This 
revelation led to the United Kingdom, Ireland, Finland and Sweden suspending 
aid for the project to Zambia whilst a number of senior PEPs were dismissed by 
the Zambian President, Edgar Lungu.24 
In 2013, forensic investigations by Malawi’s Auditor General uncovered the 
fact that significant amounts of government money had been misappropriated by a 
number of PEPs in what became known as the ‘Cashgate scandal’. This quickly 
led to a major investigation (which is ongoing) which revealed that ‘some highly 
and strategically placed politicians and public/civil servants conspired to defraud 
19 Ibid.
20 Thus a statutory provision referring to the Auditor General as the ‘statutory’ head of 
the office violates the Constitution: see the TI Kenya (n 1) [83].
21 See for example Constitution of Kenya, article 226(3).
22 TI Kenya (n 1) [5]. The case is considered in detail below.
23 In the case of Re the Matter of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission 
of Kenya [2011] eKLR, the Supreme Court of Kenya also helpfully described independent 
Commissions and bodies such as the Office of the Auditor General as ‘people’s 
watchdogs’: [59].
24 BBC News report dated 18 September 2018. 
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the Government of Malawi of large sums of money’.25 As Mr Justice Kapindu 
neatly put it:
In September 2013, gates to what was meant to be a clandestine and 
non-detectable criminal syndicate of fraudsters and money launderers were 
flung open. Information revealing an unprecedented fiscal scandal gradually 
unfolded in a manner an unsuspecting observer would have been forgiven to 
think was a masterfully scripted piece of fiction. It was a shocking reality. 
Billions of Kwacha had been embezzled from the national fiscus by some 
unscrupulous people.26
PART 2: TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE AUDITING ROLE 
Requiring Auditors General to ‘exercise their powers and perform their functions 
without fear, favour or prejudice’ is a constitutional imperative.27 Yet the Zambian 
and Malawian cases illustrate the point made by the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa that the work of the Auditor General ‘inherently entails the investigation of 
sensitive and potentially embarrassing affairs of government’,28 and those of PEPs 
in particular. In order to enable Auditors General to carry out their constitutional 
role of effective public sector auditing, eight Core Principles (the Core Principles) 
were recognised in the Mexico Declaration on Supreme Audit Authority 
Independence (the Mexico Declaration).29 These cover issues relating to 
independence, security of tenure, investigative powers, and unrestricted access to 
information. These Core Principles are noted throughout this article.30
i) Establishing and maintaining an independent office
Core Principle 2 states that the independence of the Auditor General is an essential 
requirement for proper public sector auditing. This emphasises the fundamental 
25 Republic v Lutepo [2015] MWHC 491(High Court of Malawi) (Kapindu J) [7].
26 Lutepo (n 25 [1]).
27 Constitution of South Africa 1996, article 181(2).
28 Quoting from Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 [1996] ZACC 26, 1996 (4) SA 
744 (CC), 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (First Certification) [163].
29 Agreed at the XIX Congress of the International Organization of Supreme Audit 
Authorities (INTOSAI). 
30 The African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions collaborates with the INTOSAI.
58
requirement of enshrining the independence of the office and office-holder in the 
Constitution and is discussed in Part 4 below. 
ii) Providing ‘a sufficiently broad mandate’31
In carrying out their constitutional role effectively, Auditors-General must be 
empowered to audit all state bodies or public entities. In some Constitutions, the 
specific bodies and entities are listed.32 For example, the Article 187(2) of the 
Constitution of Ghana provides:
The public accounts of Ghana and of all public offices, including the courts, 
the central and local government administrations, of the Universities and 
public institutions of like nature, of any public corporation or other body or 
organisation established by an Act of Parliament shall be audited and reported 
on by the Auditor-General.
Similarly, Article 188(1) of the Constitution of South Africa provides: 
The Auditor-General must audit and report on the accounts, financial 
statements and financial management of (a) all national and provincial state 
departments and administrations; (b) all municipalities; and (c) any other 
institution or accounting entity required by national or provincial legislation to 
be audited by the Auditor-General.
A key to a successful audit is unrestricted access to all relevant documentation 
or premises.33 This is emphasised in Article 187(3) of the Constitution of Ghana:
… [T]he Auditor-General or any person authorised or appointed for the 
purpose by the Auditor-General shall have access to all books, records, returns 
and other documents relating or relevant to those accounts.
Access to sensitive ‘national security’ information provides a particular 
challenge for, as noted earlier, there are several examples where PEPs have 
stolen state assets under the cover of spurious ‘national security’ needs. This 
focuses attention on the extent to which Auditors General enjoy in practice the 
31 Core Principle 3. 
32 For a useful discussion on the scope of the Auditor General’s powers, see Khumalo v 
Auditor General [2013] SZHC 56 (High Court of Swaziland).
33 Core Principle 4 refers to ‘unrestricted access to information’.
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‘unrestricted access to information’ required for carrying out their functions,34 
including that relating to expenditure on ‘national security’. This was the focus 
in the High Court of Kenya case of Transparency International (TI Kenya) v 
Attorney General.35
iii) The TI case
In this important case, the petitioners submitted that a number of sections of the 
Public Audit Act 2015 (PAA) were unconstitutional both in purpose and effect 
as they tended to ‘interfere with the independence and mandate of the Auditor 
General, an independent constitutional office’.36 The Constitution of Kenya 
provides, amongst other things, that the Auditor General is ‘subject only to the 
Constitution and the law and independent and not subject to direction or control 
by any person or authority’.37 Further, that in carrying his/her constitutional 
mandate the ‘Auditor-General may audit and report on the accounts of any entity 
that is funded from public funds’ (my emphasis) and ‘An audit report shall 
confirm whether or not public money has been applied lawfully and in an 
effective way’.38
One provision of the PAA that was challenged was section 40. Mwita J noted 
the section required the Auditor General ‘to hold a pre-audit meeting at the highest 
level to agree on areas to audit and the appropriate audit approach when auditing 
national security organs and even allows vetting of officers to conduct the audit’.39 
In addition, he noted that section 42 of the PAA barred the Auditor General from 
questioning government policy objectives during audits. 
In an impressive and thoughtful judgment, Mwita J declared these sections 
unconstitutional. Having discussed the constitutional provisions relating to the 
independence of the Auditor General he continued:
Flowing from the exposition above, it leaves no doubt on the unconstitutionality 
of sections 40 and 42 of the Act…. The Auditor General has a constitutional 
obligation under Article 229(4)(h) to audit and report on the accounts of state 
organs public bodies and any entity funded by public money. This cannot be 
done if the Auditor General has to seek permission by holding meetings with 
34 Core Principle 4.
35 Petition 388 of 2016; [2018] eKLR.
36 TI Kenya (n 1) [77].
37 article 249(2).
38 articles 229(5), (6).
39 TI Kenya (n 1) [118]. 
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higher authorities as proposed by section 40 before carrying out the audit. 
Subjecting officers to vetting before audit would leave room for state organs 
and public bodies to decide who to audit them. 
As regards the limitations imposed in section 42, as Mwita J explained:
The Auditor General cannot also confirm the viability of the policy objectives 
funded by the people of Kenya when section 42 suggests that he should not 
question policy objectives funded by the people. This has the effect of stifling 
his independence. A statute cannot seek to impose conditions on the Auditor 
General’s audit approaches when the Constitution gives him mandate to do his 
work without direction or control from any person or authority. This violates 
national values and principles of governance including integrity, transparency 
and accountability in Article 10 and financial openness in Article 201 of the 
Constitution. (emphasis added)40
It followed that the wide constitutional mandate of the Auditor General 
included the right to scrutinise spending by all entities that were publicly funded 
and this included the National Intelligence Service, the Kenya Defence Force and 
the National Police Service. 
Given the vast sums of money lost by states when national security becomes a 
veil for corrupt activity by PEPs, requiring transparency in spending on ‘national 
security’ is a milestone in seeking to address such criminality.41 Understandably 
public confidence and trust in national security financing requires an appropriate 
balance between secrecy and transparency. This emphasises the importance of 
having a demonstrably independent appointee holding the office of Auditor 
General.
The case also emphasises the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus any attempt 
to undermine or restrict the constitutional role and powers of the Auditor General 
by legislation must be declared unconstitutional. It also recognises the role of the 
Auditor General as the ‘ally of the people’ and emphasises the role of the 
40 TI Kenya (n 1) [118–19]. Constitution of Kenya, article 10 states: ‘The national values 
and principles of governance in this Article bind all State organs, State officers, public 
officers and all persons’ when carrying out their public functions. These include ‘good 
governance, integrity, transparency and accountability’.
41 For a helpful discussion on this area, see Transparency International (UK) report ‘Out 
of the Shadows: Promoting Openness and Accountability in the Global Defence Industry’ 
(2016) <https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/Out_of_the_Shadows_WEB3.
pdf> accessed 25 October 2018.
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office-holder as an independent watchdog body. Further it demonstrates the role of 
civil society organisations in supporting and publicising the work of such 
constitutional bodies. It is of interest that the locus standi of the petitioners in the 
TI case was not questioned. 
In Attorney General for Zambia v Meer Care and Desai42 Peter Smith J in the 
High Court of England and Wales was satisfied that the Auditor General in Zambia 
had the power to scrutinise defence procurement contracts. The position in the 
other African jurisdictions is not clear. Perhaps it is time for the civil society 
organisations in those jurisdictions to follow the lead of TI Kenya and test the 
matter in the courts.
PART 3: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY I: THE 
APPOINTMENT PROCESS 
As with other oversight bodies, it is essential that the appointment of the Auditor 
General is made through a demonstrably fair and transparent procedure. This is 
essentially a confidence-building exercise for government, public officials, 
citizens, civil society and donors alike in the integrity, independence and 
competence of the appointee. Whilst considerable attention has been paid in 
modern Constitutions to the appointment process of members of other oversight 
bodies, the position of the Auditor General often remains unsatisfactory. There are 
three key issues here: (i) the qualifications for appointment; (ii) the nomination 
process; and (iii) the appointment process itself.
i) Qualifications for appointment
Curiously, few of the Constitutions lay down any specific qualifications for 
appointment. In South Africa the Auditor General must be ‘… a fit and proper 
person to hold that office. Specialised knowledge of, or experience in, auditing, 
state finances and public administration must be given due regard in appointing 
the Auditor-General’.43 More specifically, in Kenya the Auditor General must 
‘have extensive knowledge of public finance or at least ten years’ experience in 
auditing or public finance management’.44 Such a background is surely a 
prerequisite for any such appointment.
42 n 10.
43 Section 193(3).
44 Constitution of Kenya, article 229(2).
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ii) Nominating the candidate for appointment
In most of the Constitutions it is the President who has the sole power to nominate 
the candidate.45 There is no justification for this position for it does not bring with 
it any confidence in the independence of the President’s choice. A preferable 
approach is for the nomination to emanate from a separate body. This is the 
position in Nigeria46 and Namibia47 where the recommendation for appointment 
is made by the Federal Civil Service Commission and Public Service Commission 
respectively. Of course, it raises the question as to the independence of the 
Commissions themselves. Thus in Nigeria the Commission comprises a Chairman 
and not more than fifteen other members, who ‘shall, in the opinion of the 
President, be persons of unquestionable integrity and sound political judgment’.48 
In Namibia there is a stronger formulation. The Public Service Commission 
consists of a ‘chairperson and not less than three nor more than six other persons 
nominated by the President and appointed by the National Assembly by resolution’. 
It ‘shall be independent and act impartially’.49 There is no provision for any public 
involvement in the nomination process.
iii) The appointment process
The Constitutions contain a variety of procedures concerning the appointment 
process albeit with the legislature being involved in most jurisdictions.50 The 
most common procedure is for the President to appoint the Auditor General 
‘with the approval of the legislature’51 or ‘subject to ratification’ by the 
legislature.52 This is a weak approach for the President is able to hand-pick their 
chosen candidate and then have the (normally) cooperative legislature 
45 It is recognised that separate legislation may make provision for the selection process 
but it is argued that the appointment process is so fundamental that it must be enshrined 
in the Constitution to avoid any weakening of the procedure by subsequent legislation.
46 Constitution of Nigeria, section 86(1); Constitution of Namibia, article 127(1).
47 Constitution of Namibia, article 32(3)(i).
48 Constitution of Nigeria, 3rd sch, para 10.
49 Constitution of Namibia, article 112(3). There is also a concern that the bodies making 
the recommendation are themselves subject to scrutiny by the Auditor General.
50 In Ghana, article 70(1) of the Constitution provides: ‘The President shall, acting in 
consultation with the Council of State, appoint … the Auditor-General’. Given the 
presidential influence over the Council, this does not hold out strong hopes of an 
independent assessment of the matter.
51 For example in Namibia, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Kenya. 
52 For example in Zambia. 
THE ROLE, INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE AUDITOR 
GENERAL: A COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL
63
rubber-stamp the appointment by a simple majority. A stronger formulation is 
found in the Constitution of Malawi which provides that the appointment must 
be confirmed by the National Assembly by a majority of the members present 
and voting.53 
In South Africa the support of at least 60 per cent of the members of the 
National Assembly is required.54 The rationale for such a requirement was noted 
by Mogoeng CJ in the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Helen Suzman 
Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others: 55 
… [I]n the case of the Public Protector and Auditor-General the Constitution 
goes further, requiring that the recommendation be approved by a 
supermajority. These are the two institutions of accountability whose gaze … 
is fixed firmly on the political branches; their task ‘inherently entails 
investigation of sensitive and potentially embarrassing affairs of government’56.
In Nigeria the appointment is subject to confirmation by the Senate57 which 
has the power to reject a presidential nomination.58 The role of the Auditor 
General as the ‘ally of the people’ raises the issue of public involvement in the 
appointment process. Regrettably, the only Constitution to address this important 
point is the Constitution of South Africa where section 194(6) provides that the 
‘involvement of civil society in the recommendation process [for the appointment 
of the Auditor General] may be provided for as envisaged in section 59(1)’. 
Section 59(1) states that ‘the National Assembly must … facilitate public 
involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly and its 
committees’. 
All of the Constitutions provide that the President formally appoints the 
Auditor General. This is unexceptional. However, the current procedure for 
appointment in most Constitutions arguably provides the President with far too 
53 Section 184(1).
54 article 193(5).
55 [2014] ZACC 32, 2015 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), 2015 (2) SA 1 (CC) [159].
56 Quoting from Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (n 28) [163].
57 Constitution of Nigeria, section 86(1).
58 In December 2016, the Senate rejected the nomination by President Buhari of Ibrahim 
Magu as the Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission based on an 
adverse ‘security report’ from the State Security Service. The power of the Senate to do so 
was upheld by the Abuja Federal High Court in Ojamo v Attorney General of the 
Federation of Nigeria (2018 unreported). 
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much influence, especially given the perceived weakness of the legislature in 
many jurisdictions. If the Auditor General is to be, and be seen by the public as 
being, an ‘ally of the people’ whose mission as an independent constitutional 
office-holder is to protect public finances, then there must be confidence in the 
transparency and reliability of the appointment process. 
Arguably the objective is the same as with judicial appointments: i.e. to appoint 
‘a professionally competent person of proven integrity’ with candidates being 
drawn from as wide a pool as possible. It follows that restricting the nomination 
process to the President is unacceptable and that there should be an opportunity 
for the public involvement in the process. 
PART 4: CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN SUPPORT OF 
INDIVIDUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY II: 
ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL AUTONOMY
Article 187(7) of the Constitution of Ghana neatly encapsulates the independence 
of the Auditor General: 
‘In the performance of his functions under this Constitution or any other law 
the Auditor-General … shall not be subject to the direction or control of any 
other person or authority…’59 
The office and office-holder must therefore be entirely independent of 
government60 including the Public Service Commission (PSC),61 a key point as 
the PSC itself is subject to the audit process.
i) Financial autonomy
Core Principle 8 states that an Auditor General requires: ‘Financial and managerial/
administrative autonomy and the availability of appropriate human, material and 
monetary resources’. This means that the administrative expenses of the office of 
59 TI Kenya (n 1) [117]: Mwita J also noted that ‘as the [holder] of an independent office, 
he is subject only to the Constitution and the law and is not subject to direction or control 
of any person or authority’.
60 The point was also emphasised in Thomas v Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago 
[1982] AC 113, 124 (Lord Diplock), where he observed that the purpose of such provisions 
was to insulate members from political interference exercised directly upon them by the 
government of the day.
61 A point specifically made in the Constitution of Namibia, article 127(3). 
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the Auditor General must be charged on the Consolidated Fund.62 It also follows 
that the recruitment of staff and other staffing matters are solely a matter for the 
office-holder and thus the Public Service Commission plays no part in the process. 
In essence, ‘… the workings of the Auditor General including recruitment and 
discipline cannot be subject to the Public Service Commission or any other 
authority’ and any provision to the contrary violates such independence.63 
The importance of the point is illustrated by the fact that in several countries 
‘advisory boards’ have been established which threaten this independence. For 
example, in Kenya, the Audit Advisory Board (AAB) was established by the 
Public Audit Act 2015, its principle function being to ‘advise the Auditor General 
on how to discharge his/her mandate under the Constitution’. In the TI case, Mwita 
J highlighted the independence of the Auditor General which was enshrined in 
article 249(2) and which provided that the office-holder is not under ‘the direction 
or control of any person or authority’.64 The role of the AAB was therefore an 
‘interference with his institutional and individual independence’ which altered the 
‘constitutional architecture of the independent office of the Auditor General and 
violated article 249(2)’.65 He therefore had no hesitation in declaring the provision 
inconsistent with the Constitution of Kenya. This is a most welcome ruling and 
should encourage civil society organisations in other jurisdictions to seek judicial 
review of the constitutionality of any domestic legislation adversely affecting the 
office of the Auditor General. 
For Ghana the matter is more complex in that the Audit Service Board (ASB) 
is established by Article 189 of the Constitution of Ghana. Its membership 
comprises (a) a chairman and four other members appointed by the President, 
acting in consultation with the Council of State; (b) the Auditor General; and 
(c) the Head of the Civil Service or his representative.66 Its functions directly 
impact on the independence of the Auditor General. Articles 189(2) and 
(3) provide that ‘the appointment of officers and other employees in the Audit 
Service, other than the Auditor General, shall be made by the Audit Service 
Board, acting in consultation with the Public Services Commission’. Articles 
189(2) and (3) also provide that the ASB ‘shall, acting in consultation with the 
Public Services Commission … determine the terms and conditions of service 
62 This includes all salaries, allowances, gratuities and pensions payable to or in respect 
of persons serving in the Audit Service: see for example article 187(14) Constitution of 
Ghana.
63 TI Kenya (n 1) [88] (Mwita J). See also [101].
64 TI Kenya (n 1) [114].
65 TI Kenya [116] (Mwita J).
66 article 189(1).
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of officers and other employees in the Audit Service’. These provisions constitute 
a direct interference with the institutional and individual independence of the 
Auditor General and are inconsistent with article 187(7) of Constitution of Ghana 
which was noted earlier. This is another fruitful issue for a civil society 
organisation to take up in the courts.
ii) Security of tenure 
Core Principle 2 states that Auditors General must enjoy security of tenure. 
Inevitably, this is linked to the term of office for the incumbent. Here the 
Constitutions vary considerably. The majority provide for a fixed, non-renewable 
term with the length varying between five years and twelve years. In Namibia 
the Auditor General holds office for five years but is eligible for re-appointment.67 
The danger of a fixed-term appointment is that the experience, expertise and 
public confidence in the office-holder is likely to be lost. Further, given that there 
is no constitutional provision relating to the time-frame for appointment of a new 
office-holder, there may be a lengthy hiatus (deliberate or otherwise) before the 
new appointment is made by the President. This can significantly affect the 
operation and effectiveness of the office, especially where ongoing investigations 
into possible criminality by PEPs are concerned. 
The different approaches perhaps reflect the uncertainty as to the position of 
the Auditor General. In practice the Constitutions almost invariably provide for a 
fixed-term appointment to other ‘national institutions’. Yet these are largely multi-
member bodies where a periodic change of membership is inevitable. As the work 
of the Auditor General ‘inherently entails investigation of sensitive and potentially 
embarrassing affairs of government’ including any potential wrongdoing by PEPs, 
the office-holder is in a very different position from those in other national 
institutions.68 Given this reality, arguably the office-holder must enjoy the same 
terms and conditions as that of a senior judge. Suitable illustrations come from 
Nigeria where the position of the Auditor General is similar to that of a judge, i.e. 
she/he holds office until retiring age69 and from Ghana where the Auditor General 
is appointed until retirement age.70
67 article 127(1).
68 The same point applies to the appointment of the director of an Anti-Corruption 
Commission.
69 Section 87(2).
70 article 187(12).
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PART 5: SUPPORTING AND OVERSEEING THE WORK OF THE 
AUDITOR GENERAL
The Chiluba case illustrates the failure of an Auditor General to perform his 
constitutional responsibilities. As noted earlier, the then President of Zambia, 
Frederick Chiluba and several of his close associates (all PEPs) looted large sums 
of state money under the guise of national security needs through what was known 
as the Zamtrop account. During the entire time the criminality was taking place, 
the Auditor General remained inactive and also failed in his constitutional duty to 
make annual reports to Parliament.71 As Peter Smith J explained in Attorney 
General for Zambia v Meer Care & Desai:
Mr Siame, the Auditor General failed properly to exercise his duties or 
alternatively chose not to exercise the duties required of him probably because 
of the intimidatory nature of Chungu [Chiluba’s national security chief and 
co-conspirator] and the unwillingness of the Auditor General to challenge him 
and thus the President.72
However, payments though the Zamtrop account were still subject to scrutiny 
by the Auditor General. Yet, as Peter Smith J noted: 
There are provisions for the issue of certificates to the Auditor General on a 
quarterly basis. I observe that there were indications of audit approvals in the 
early 1990s but none has been discovered for the period the subject matter of 
this action... 
This highlights the pressure PEPs can exert on Auditors General and 
emphasises once again the significance of maintaining the independence of the 
office-holder and his/her staff. It also emphasises the need to ensure that effective 
‘guarding of the guards’ safeguards are in place. 
i) The role of parliament 
Reflecting Core Principle 5, i.e. the right and obligation to report on their work, a 
typical constitutional requirement is for the Auditor General to submit his/her 
report to the legislature within a specified time period after the end of the preceding 
71 See now Constitution of Zambia, article 121(4). 
72 n 10. The payments were also facilitated through the bribery of a senior public official 
in the Ministry of Finance.
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financial year. A specialist multi-party public accounts committee (or equivalent) 
is then to review the report and may call any Ministers, public officials or others to 
explain any discrepancies. The annual report may be supplemented by ad hoc 
reports. The legislature is then required to debate the report of the Auditor General 
and to make recommendations or give instructions for follow-up action.73 For 
example, article 229(8) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that ‘within three 
months after receiving an audit report, Parliament … shall debate and consider the 
report and take appropriate action’.74 Such a provision should be enshrined in 
every Constitution.
The Chiluba case illustrates the challenge of making such scrutiny effective 
in practice. The Auditor General was under a constitutional mandate to lay an 
annual report before parliament but never did so. Parliamentarians failed to 
pursue this. Thus whilst constitutional safeguards did exist their failure meant 
that Chiluba and his associates were able to carry out their criminal conspiracy. 
In essence, through the intimidation or bribery of key public officials their 
criminality was hidden from view by the failure of the constitutional 
safeguards. 75 
The extent to which parliamentary scrutiny is effective in practice is 
questionable. For example, a report published on behalf of the African 
Parliamentarians Network Against Corruption found that ‘too few African 
parliaments have effective committee systems, and it is rarely possible to properly 
scrutinise the behaviour of ministers or the senior civil servants who work with 
them’.76 This highlights two potential issues. First, the extent to which the 
appropriate expertise and experience is available in order for parliamentarians to 
assess and interpret the reports of the Auditor General. Second, given the reality 
73 Core Principles 5–7 recognise (i) the right and obligation of supreme audit authorities 
to report on their work; (ii) the freedom both to decide the content and timing of audit 
reports and to publish and disseminate them; and (iii) the need for effective follow-up 
mechanisms on their recommendations. 
74 See for example Constitution of Ghana, article 187(5) and (6) and Constitution of 
Nigeria, section 85(5). The Constitution of Kenya, article 229(8) provides that ‘within 
three months after receiving an audit report, Parliament … shall debate and consider the 
report and take appropriate action’.
75 For another glaring example of a failure by a parliamentary committee to address a 
corruption issue, see Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, ‘Politics, Donors and the 
Ineffectiveness of Anti-Corruption Institutions in Uganda’ (2006) 44(1) Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 101. 
76 Joanne Davis Parliamentarians and Corruption in Africa: The Challenge of 
Leadership and the Practice of Politics (The Parliamentary Centre, Ottawa 2009).
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of executive control over parliamentary business, whether there is the commitment 
or ability on the part of parliamentarians to do so.77 
It means that additional support mechanisms are required.
ii) The role of public officials and whistleblowing
Whilst a discussion on whistleblowing is beyond the scope of this article, a few 
comments in relation to the Auditor General are appropriate. 
The use of whistleblowers is a potentially vital means by which to break 
through the secrecy surrounding corruption cases involving PEPs. The need for 
states to develop effective whistleblowing schemes is reflected in article 8(4) of the 
UNCAC which provides that each State Party must consider:
… [E]stablishing measures and system to facilitate the reporting by public 
officials of acts of corruption to appropriate authorities, when such acts come 
to their attention in the performance of their functions. 
The Auditor General clearly falls into the category of an ‘appropriate authority’. 
A CoSP resolution also calls on UNCAC States Parties to establish ‘measures and 
systems to facilitate the reporting of incidents’ which may be considered to 
constitute Convention offences.78 
It is trite that corruption and abuse of office by PEPs requires the assistance or 
acquiescence of others, both within and outside the public service and information 
provided by whistleblowers is one of the most common ways in which instances of 
such criminality are identified.79 This emphasises the importance of having in 
place effective whistleblowing laws and mechanisms which facilitate reporting to 
an appropriate authority, and in particular, the Auditor General. 
Arguably, this includes placing a duty on public officials to report corrupt 
practices or other misuse of office within the public service. This is clearly 
contentious, not least because of the dangers this may well pose to the whistleblower 
and his/her family. The argument for doing so is set out neatly in the Explanatory 
77 Akech also suggests that key parliamentary committees are themselves implicated in 
corruption and therefore take no effective steps to address the reports of the Auditor 
General: see Migai Akech ‘Abuse of Power and Corruption in Kenya’ (2011) 18(1) Ind J 
Global Legal Stud 342.
78 UNCAC Conference of States Parties resolution 6/6 of 2015: Follow-up to the 
Marrakech declaration on the prevention of corruption (2015) para 4. 
79 UNODC The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Resource Guide on 
Good Practices in the Protection of Reporting Person (2015) 3.
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Memorandum to the Council of Europe Code of Conduct for Public Officials 
which notes that whilst this could create tensions amongst public officials, ‘the 
passive or tolerant attitude of public officials regarding breaches would be more 
harmful for public administration and society as a whole’.80 
In fact anti-corruption legislation in South Africa already places a duty on any 
person who holds a ‘position of authority’ and who ‘knows or ought reasonably to 
have known or suspected that any other person’ has committed a serious corruption 
offence to report the fact to any police official.81 This position is potentially 
complicated by state security legislation which criminalises the unauthorised 
disclosure of government documents/information.82 Given that the Auditor 
General is specifically authorised to have access to all government documentation, 
including national security information, there is no reason why such a reporting 
mechanism is not put in place. 
iii) The role of civil society/the media
Civil society organisations (CSOs) can play both an oversight role and a supportive 
role.
The oversight role involves the monitoring of the work of the Auditor General. 
For example, in the Chiluba case the failure of the Auditor General to submit 
annual reports to the Zambian parliament and the failure of parliamentarians to 
address the matter represented a fundamental breakdown of the constitutional 
safeguards. By directing media attention to this situation CSOs would have raised 
public awareness of this failure and called for an explanation. This provides a 
‘safe’ and constructive role for CSOs in that attention is not being drawn to any 
allegation of corruption or other wrongdoing by PEPs or a ‘cover-up’ but merely 
highlighting the constitutional responsibility of the Auditor General. 
Where concern arises regarding a failure to carry out the constitutional 
mandate, CSOs may also consider lodging a complaint with another constitutional 
‘watchdog’ body. For example, in the Ouko case (see below), the complainant had 
previously lodged a series of complaints concerning a breach of the constitutional 
80 para 70.
81 Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (No 12 of 2004) section 34. See 
also section 39(1) Prevention and Combating of Corruption Act 2007 (Tanzania). As 
suggested above, a requirement to report to the Auditor General would be more appropriate. 
82 For example, during his investigation into the corruption by PEPs in Kenya, Justice 
Bosire specifically referred to the effect of the law and oath of secrecy on silencing public 
officials: see Republic of Kenya Report of the Judicial Commission of Enquiry into the 
Goldenberg Affair (2005) 842.
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obligations of the Auditor General with the Kenya Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission. Such a failure arguably also falls within the jurisdiction of the office 
of the ombudsman (or similar national institution) which has a mandate to 
investigate complaints of ‘maladministration’.83 
Key supportive work of CSOs includes undertaking public education initiatives 
to highlight the constitutional role of the Auditor General as the ‘ally of the people’. 
Helping people to understand the constitutional safeguards and focusing attention 
on their effective operation (or otherwise) can arguably make a real contribution 
towards developing transparency and accountability in the management of public 
affairs. In addition, CSOs can play a useful role in assisting parliamentarians to 
understand and ensure the implementation of the constitutional safeguards with 
regard to public sector finance.84 
In order to assess the work of the office, public access to annual reports of the 
Auditor General is essential. In the TI Kenya case, for example, the petitioner 
challenged the constitutionality of section 72 of the PAA which recognised the 
right of public access to such reports ‘except where such access may unduly 
jeopardise state security’. It was argued by the petitioner that any limitation on 
access to the reports must satisfy the test for the limitation on the enjoyment of 
rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Whilst not 
deciding the point, Mwita J noted that any ‘limitation on grounds of national 
security would have to be justified’ particularly in view of the right to freedom of 
information enshrined in article 35 of the Constitution of Kenya.85 Thus once 
published, reports by Auditors General become public documents and it was 
therefore the constitutional right of every citizen to have access to the document 
subject to any constitutional rather than statutory limitation. 
The role of the courts in supporting CSOs should not be overlooked. This is 
epitomised by the TI Kenya case in which Transparency International (Kenya) had 
locus standi (a point seemingly unchallenged) to lodge a petition in support of the 
83 Although it is not clear in some cases as to whether the jurisdiction of an ombudsman 
is strictly limited to public officials: as has been noted earlier, the Auditor General is a 
constitutional office-holder and not a public official.
84 Providing assistance and information to parliamentarians to help ensure that all 
constitutional safeguards are fully understood is a potentially important role for CSOs: 
see The Abuja Guidelines on the relationship between Parliaments, Parliamentarians 
and Commonwealth National Human Rights Institutions (2004) <https://www.agora-parl.
org/sites/default/files/guidelines_abujaworkshop.pdf> accessed 3 October 2018.
85 Article 35 provides that ‘Every citizen has the right of access to information held by the 
State’ and that ‘The State shall publish and publicise any important information affecting 
the nation’.
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independence of the Auditor General. This generous approach to standing should 
encourage other CSOs to make use of the courts to challenge any threats to the 
work of Auditors General.
PART 6: REMOVING THE AUDITOR GENERAL
i) Grounds for removal
The grounds for removal enshrined in the Constitutions are similar to those of a 
judge. For example the Constitution of Namibia provides: ‘The Auditor General 
may be removed from office by reason of an ‘inability to discharge the functions 
of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body) or for misconduct’.86 
Similarly, in South Africa the Auditor General may be removed from office only 
on the ground of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence.87 In Kenya article 
251(1) provides that the grounds for removal are a serious violation of the 
Constitution or any other law; gross misconduct, whether in the performance of 
the member’s or office-holder’s functions or otherwise; physical or mental 
incapacity to perform the functions of office; incompetence; or bankruptcy. Less 
satisfactory is the position in Nigeria where the Auditor General may be removed 
from office by the President on grounds of an ‘inability to discharge the functions 
of his office (whether arising from infirmity of mind or body or any other cause) 
or for misconduct’ (emphasis added).88 
ii) Procedure for removal 
a) Commencing the removal process 
How the removal procedure is commenced requires careful scrutiny as it offers a 
mechanism to intimidate and/or undermine the Auditor General. This is based on 
the fact that the Constitutions typically provide that the President may suspend the 
Auditor General from office after the start of the removal proceedings. 
In most of the Constitutions, parliamentarians or a parliamentary committee 
may commence an investigation. For example, section 184(3) of the Constitution 
of Malawi provides that the ‘Public Appointments Committee may at any time 
inquire as to the competence of the person so appointed to perform the duties of 
86 Article 127(4).
87 Section 194(1).
88 Section 87(1).
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that office and as to the financial probity of a person so appointed, so far as it is 
relevant to the duties of that office’. 
Who else may request that the possible removal of the Auditor General is 
rarely elaborated in the Constitutions. The right of an individual to do so was 
brought into issue in the 2017 decision of the Kenyan High Court in Republic v 
Speaker of the National Assembly & 4 others Ex-Parte Edward R.O. Ouko (the 
Ouko case).89 Here article 251(2) of the Constitution of Kenya specifically 
provided that ‘a person desiring the removal of [the Auditor General] on any 
[relevant] ground may present a petition to the National Assembly setting out the 
alleged facts constituting that ground’. The National Assembly must then consider 
the petition and, if it is satisfied that it discloses a ground for removal, must send 
the petition to the President. The President may then suspend the Auditor General 
pending the outcome of the complaint. 
The case raises several issues of general concern. First, the complaint was 
submitted to the National Assembly by a petitioner, who was the legal representative 
of an undisclosed complainant who sought the removal of Mr Ouko. The prospect 
of a series of such petitions being presented to the National Assembly by any 
number of anonymous individuals is clearly of practical concern, particularly 
when dealing with them is liable to distract the Auditor General and can be used 
by political enemies or disgruntled individuals to undermine the work of the 
office-holder. In the case itself, the anonymous complainant had made a series of 
complaints concerning Mr Ouko, some of which fell within the scope of article 
251. However, these had already been referred to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption 
Commission and the Director of Public Prosecutions whose investigations had 
vindicated Mr Ouko. In essence the petitioner was ‘forum shopping’.
Second, the procedure adopted by Parliament was questionable. Here the 
petitioner was permitted to give unsworn testimony before a parliamentary 
committee and this was heard without the applicant, Mr Ouko, being given any 
prior notice of the hearing nor afforded a chance to cross-examine the petitioner. 
Further the applicant had not been informed of the precise nature of the allegations 
against him nor given sufficient time to address them. Whilst not disputing the 
right of parliament to deal with the matter and to regulate its own procedures, the 
applicant argued that there was procedural unfairness in the manner in which the 
parliamentary committee approached the matter. Odunga J upheld this argument 
pointing out that any such action must be constitutional and lawful. Article 47 of 
the Constitution of Kenya specifically provided: ‘Every person has the right to 
administrative action …’. He therefore held, correctly it is argued, that the article 
required a court to look both at the merits and legality of an administrative decision 
89 Ouko [2017] eKLR.
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and at the process and procedure adopted.90 Further he said even at common law 
fairness in administrative action was paramount.91 
This point raises a broader question concerning the separation of powers and 
the right of the courts to question parliamentary proceedings. The Commonwealth 
(Latimer House) Principles emphasise: ‘Parliamentarians must be able to carry 
out their legislative and constitutional functions in accordance with the 
Constitution, free from unlawful interference’.92 However, as Odunga J pointed 
out, the Constitution is supreme and thus Parliament ‘cannot enjoy privileges, 
immunities and powers which are inconsistent with the fundamental rights 
guaranteed in the Constitution … Parliamentary privilege does not extend to 
violation of the Constitution [and where Parliament does so] the Court’s jurisdiction 
would not be defeated…’.93 In doing so he ‘associated himself’ with a series of 
decisions from other Commonwealth jurisdictions94 and affirmed the words of 
Lord Denning in Gouriet v Union of Post Workers noted earlier, ‘Be you ever so 
high, the law is above you’. 
Odunga J also addressed an argument by the respondents that the parliamentary 
committee was exercising an administrative function and not a quasi-judicial 
function. In his view, the issue for the court was not whether the action was 
described as ‘quasi-judicial’ or ‘administrative’ but rather whether Parliament was 
‘undertaking an act that affects the legal rights and interests of the applicant to 
whom the action related’.95 This was clearly the case here.
As a result, Odunga J issued a declaration that the proceedings conducted by 
the appropriate parliamentary committee failed to meet the threshold of fair 
administrative action and ordered that the committee conduct its proceedings in 
strict compliance with and adherence to Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya.
90 para 118. In doing so, he referred with approval to the decision of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa in Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
[2000] (1) SA 1 [135]–[136] which applied section 33 of the Constitution of South Africa 
which was in similar terms to the Kenyan provision. 
91 Ibid [79].
92 para III(a). 
93 Ibid [81].
94 For example Biti v Minister of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs [2002] ZWSC 
10 (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe); Doctors for Life v Speaker of the National Assembly 
[2006] (6) SA 416 (Constitutional Court of South Africa).
95 Ibid [112]. In doing so, the judge adopted the words of Lord Denning in Breen v 
Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 2 QB 175 [190] who emphasised that whether 
functions are described as judicial or quasi-judicial or as administrative the body still 
must act fairly.
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b) The removal process
Given the status of the Auditor General and the need to avoid the politicisation of 
the matter, there is a strong case for the decision regarding removal being a matter 
for the judiciary. This is the position in Kenya where the President must appoint a 
judicial tribunal of enquiry which is to investigate the matter ‘expeditiously’ and 
must to make a binding recommendation upon which the President must act within 
thirty days.96 In Ghana, the matter is entirely removed from the legislature with 
the procedure for removal of the Auditor General being the same as that of a 
senior judge.97
Where the removal process involves the legislature, the approach in South 
Africa provides an important model. This is commenced by a finding by a 
committee of the National Assembly of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence 
on the part of the Auditor General. If the National Assembly then adopts by a 
resolution supported by at least two-thirds of its membership calling for the 
removal from office of the Auditor General, the President must remove the 
Auditor General from office. Interestingly, the drafters of the 1996 Constitution 
provided that the removal process required a simple majority of National 
Assembly members only. However the Constitutional Court did not consider that 
this adequately safeguarded that office-holder’s independence and impartiality 
and the constitutional provision was accordingly amended to require a two-thirds 
majority.98 Similarly, in Nigeria, the Auditor General may be removed from 
office solely by the President ‘acting on an address supported by two-thirds 
majority of the Senate’. 
The requirement for a super-majority provides a welcome additional safeguard. 
However, the concern remains that the weakness of many legislatures and the 
dominance of the ruling party in many jurisdictions may inevitably result in the 
politicisation of the removal decision. 
96 The tribunal must consist of a person who holds or has held office as a judge of a 
superior court, at least two persons who are qualified to be appointed as High Court 
judges; and one other member who is qualified to assess the facts in respect of the 
particular ground for removal: see Article 251(5). It is required to investigate the matter 
expeditiously, report on the facts and make a binding recommendation to the President, 
who must act in accordance with the recommendation within thirty days.
97 article 187(13).
98 See Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (n 28).
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PART 7: CONCLUSION 
The power of PEPs to ‘control the controls’ facilitates corrupt practices and misuse 
of public office. The challenge is to prevent the abuse of this power and to protect 
the good governance values of integrity, transparency and accountability enshrined 
in constitutions. This article has argued that as the ‘ally of the people’, the Auditor 
General can, and must, play a leading role through ensuring fiscal integrity. This 
has the dual purpose of both encouraging ‘ethical behaviour [by PEPs] by making 
unethical behaviour hard to accomplish and easy to detect’ and helping to bring to 
light any abuse of power.99 As Klug neatly puts it, such an independent 
constitutional institution has ‘a distinct role in ensuring that the promises of human 
rights and good governance [enshrined in the Constitution] reach down into the 
daily administration of the country…’.100 
All the Constitutions noted in this study make provision for the office of the 
Auditor General and, as the examples from Zambia and Malawi illustrate, an 
effective Auditor General poses a threat to corrupt PEPs by ‘[flinging open] the 
gates to what was meant to be a clandestine and non-detectable criminal syndicate 
of fraudsters and money launderers’.101 Yet the cases of Chiluba and Abacha, for 
example, highlight the pressure that PEPs can exert on office-holders. Thus the 
real test is the extent to which, in practice, Auditors General enjoy the necessary 
individual and institutional independence and security of tenure to enable them to 
carry out their constitutional mandate effectively. This includes enjoying access to 
all public expenditure, including that relating to ‘national security’. However, this 
article has demonstrated that several of the Constitutions do not adequately protect 
the office and the office-holder and that there is a need to strengthen key provisions. 
Fundamentally there is a need to review the relationship between the Auditor 
General and the legislature. Retaining the close working relationship between the 
two as regards fiscal matters remains essential. This includes the supportive role 
of the legislature through the appropriate scrutiny and follow-up on annual audit 
reports. There is also an accountability role for the legislature which must also 
follow up any failure by the Auditor General to submit such reports. However, 
given the weakness of many legislatures, their role in the appointment and removal 
process of the Auditor General raises serious concerns. In most of the jurisdictions 
under discussion, the present constitutional arrangements arguably do not 
99 n 17.
100 Heinz Klug, ‘Accountability and the Role of Independent Constitutional Institutions in 
South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Constitutions’ (2015-2016) 60 NY Law School Law Review 
153, 156.
101 See Republic v Lutepo (n 25) (Kapindu J). 
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adequately protect the independence of the office and office-holder in practice. 
Instead it is argued that the position of the Auditor General should be equated to 
that of a senior judge including enjoying the same terms and conditions as regards 
security of tenure and removal. 
As an ‘ally of the people’ the Auditor General requires support from civil 
society organisations. The article has highlighted a range of opportunities for 
doing so, such as publicising and monitoring the work of the office. This includes 
enjoying public access to the reports of the Auditor General. Challenging attempts 
to undermine its operation is another key measure including, where necessary, 
resort to the courts. The TI case neatly demonstrates how effective such action can 
be and should encourage CSOs in other jurisdictions to challenge any attempt to 
restrict the work of the Auditor General. 
To adapt Lord Denning’s words ‘Be you ever so high, the Constitution is above 
you’. The Auditor General as a constitutional office-holder has the power to control 
PEPs and thus uphold the good governance values enshrined in the Constitution. It 
is hoped that the views expressed in this article will contribute to making this role 
more effective in practice and truly make the Auditor General the ‘ally of the 
people’. 
